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Looking  at  the  studies  of  child  language  development  from  a  historical 
perspective, it is undeniable that the opinions of the majority of psycholinguists 
are convergent when it comes to the observable phenomena accompanying first 
language acquisition, as pointed out by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1998:231). 
They distinguish several stages in this process, e.g. the first stage consists in the 
production of front nasalised vowels indicating some kind of discomfort to the 
baby. Next, irrespective of the native language of the baby’s parents, the period 
of  babbling  commences.  It  is  characterised  by  the  gradual  emergence  of 
consonants.  These  are  the  syllables  such  as:  wa...wa...wa,  la....la....la,  etc., 
produced whenever babies are cheerful and pleased. The next stage is lalling 
during  which  the  child  engages  in  the  repetition  of  the  heard  sounds.  The 
intensification of this process is called echoalia. At the end of this stage children 
begin to produce their first words. Needless to say, lalling and echoalia mark the 
onset of speech production and remarkably differ from language to language.
1 
However,  the  interpretation  of  these  phenomena  has  always  been  under 
dispute and it consequently divided linguists into adherents of two contradictory 
hypotheses: behaviorism on one side and innatism on the other. What is more, 
another theory was formulated, called constructivism, which can be described as 
being  halfway  between  the  former  and  the  latter  ones  (see  Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk (1980)). 
At this point let us consider the main assumptions of the above mentioned 
theories. In 1957 Skinner published his Verbal Behaviour, in which he claimed 
that language is a set of habits and can be taught by the process of instrumental 
 
 
1 An example of echoalia in Polish and English respectively would be: pa-pa and bye-bye for 
saying ‘goodbye’ or mama and mummy for addressing a mother. On the other hand, the same 
syllable da is interpreted as ‘daddy’ by English-speaking parents and as „daj” (‘give’) by Polish or 
Russian-speaking parents.   
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conditioning, i.e. by developing a relationship between a particular stimulus (S) 
and a desired response (R). This takes place when appropriate responses are 
reinforced  until  they  become  automatic  and  mechanical.  In  other  words, 
language acquisition takes place when the child is given positive feedback from 
his environment for correct utterances. In contrast, faulty vocalisations don’t get 
established as habits because they don’t meet with the parents’ or caretakers’ 
approval. 
Two years later, however, radical behaviourism came in for a bitter criticism 
when  Chomsky  (1959)  presented  a  completely  different  view  of  language 
acquisition. In his view, language is not a set of habits, but it is rule-governed; 
subsequently,  the  mind  is  responsible  for  the  perception  and  processing  of 
linguistic  data  because  it  is  genetically  equipped  with  devices  that  make 
language acquisition possible. This mechanism is referred to as LAD (language 
acquisition device). Another notion introduced by Chomsky is that of language 
universals, which he defined as abstract representations of grammatical rules. 
They are general, i.e. they pertain to all natural languages. In the generative-
transformational  approach,  language  acquisition  takes  place  according  to  a 
genetic  programme,  in  which  the  linguistic  data  merely  activates  liguistic 
knowledge stored in the mind. Since I am going to focus on Chomsky's theory 
more exhaustively later on, I will not elaborate on this issue at this point. 
Nowadays it is hardly possible to adopt any of these two options directly: 
either  extreme  behaviourism  or  radical  innatism  (Cunningham  1972). 
Psychological research has recently progressed in the direction of regarding the 
human being as a mixture of genetically determined capacities and knowledge 
gained by experience. 
Thus,  the  behaviourist  view  of  language  acquisition  has  been  criticised 
sharply on the grounds of its oversimplicity. It ignores completely the inborn 
aspect of human knowledge, that is, the existence of congenital potential which 
makes  learning  possible.  According  to  the  stimulus-response  theory,  the 
children's activity is limited to a passive reception of the stimuli coming from the 
environment.  They  do  not  make  any  conscious  effort  to  organise  the 
accumulating experience, since they are equipped with no mechanism warranting 
this  process.  Behaviourist  theory  ignores  completely  the  creativity  of  human 
beings,  making  children  rather  passive  viewers  than  actors  in  the  process  of 
language acquisition. Thus, they are deprived of the possibility to shape their 
language behaviour in a conscious way. However, it has been proved that passive 
exposure to language  does  not  result  in  mastering  it. To  illustrate this  point, 
Snow (1977) shows that Dutch children, who watch German television many 
hours a day, do not end up with an active knowledge of German. 
By the same token, it is not possible to adhere to radical innatism, either. The 
innatist  approach  to  language  acquisition  also  discards  the  assumption  that 
children are endowed with the capacity to construct step by step their linguistic  
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reality, as emphasized by Piaget, but on thoroughly different grounds. It stresses 
the importance of heredity, but in the form of the innately determined LAD, 
which,  however,  does  not  take  part  in  an  active  construction  of  knowledge. 
Innatists claim that all knowledge, including linguistic knowledge is preformed, 
that is, its structure and content are genetically determined. 
As far as Jean Piaget is concerned, in his work from 1948, he expresses the 
opinion  that  cognitive  and  linguistic  development  depends  heavily  both  on 
environmental  and  hereditary  factors  (Piaget  1948).  He  formulates  the 
constructionist theory of first language acquisition on the basis of diary studies 
of his children: Jacqueline, Lucienne and Laurent. According to him, stages, that 
is, particular phases in cognitive and linguistic growth, are actively constructed 
by  the  child  who  builds  upon  earlier  structures  through  interaction  with  the 
environment. 
According to Piaget, a pattern of human behaviour consists of functions and 
structures.  As  the  child  develops,  functions  remain  invariant,  but  structures 
change in a systematic and predictable order. This change in structures is the 
essence of development. The term structure refers to properties of an event, both 
internal (that is, its mental representation in the mind) and external (that is, its 
observable properties and features). The structural units are called in Piaget's 
system schemata (Piaget 1948). Schemata form a kind of network that acts as a 
receiver of incoming data and is continually changing its shape in order to better 
assimilate those data. Overt behaviour is presuambly organized by them as well. 
Function, however, refers to biologically inherited modes of interacting with the 
environment. Piaget has distinguished between two basic functions: organization 
(that is every act is organized) and adaptation (that is the dynamic aspect of 
organization), as pointed out by Piaget (1952). As far as adaptation is concerned, 
Piaget further subdivided it into assimilation and accommodation. According to 
him, they are responsible for advancement from one cognitive stage to another. 
Assimilation  is  the  process  of  applying  old  schemas  to  new  objects  and 
events. Let us imagine that the child has the three schemas of grasping, biting 
and shaking and it is confronted with a new object, for example, a stuffed doll. It 
will try to understand this object by making use of its old schemas, which means 
that it will grasp, bite and shake the stuffed doll. 
Accommodation consists in modifying some elements of an old schema or 
learning a new schema which is more appropriate for a new object or event. For 
example, the crying schema can be modified by changing the pitch or intensity, 
depending on the kind of the need to be expressed. 
Accommodation and assimilation are called functional invariants because 
they are charasteristic of all biological systems. However, they are not always in 
balance with one another. Advances in cognitive development become greater 
when accommodation plays a larger role than assimilation since then the range 
of the child's behaviour expands because the child learns the new schemas that  
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will be appropriate for a new situation. The more such instances, the better for 
the child, because then its repertoire of behaviour expands. 
Development, then, is perceived by Piaget as a continuous interaction of 
assimilation with accommodation, which finally leads to the third process of 
organization, by which Piaget means the ability of the child to organize and 
construct reality. At this point it is necessary to present Piaget's idea of cognitive 
development, which he conceives in terms of the units called periods which can 
further be subdivided into the above mentioned stages (Piaget 1948). As far as 
the foundations for speech production and perception are concerned it is during 
the Sensorimotor Period that they are established. Piaget calls it sensorimotor 
because the child solves problems by means of its sensory systems and motor 
activity. This term also implies that the child derives understanding of the world 
from its actions, solely from what it senses and does. Since at this time abstract 
thinking is nonexistent, the child does not analyse problems, plan strategies and 
wonder  what  their  consequences  will  be.  Let  us  now  concentrate  on  the 
description  of  the  six  sensorimotor  stages  (Piaget  1948)  in  order  to  trace 
cognitive development of the child, which is interlinked with the acquisition of 
its native language. 
Stage 1: Exercising the ready-made sensorimotor schemata (0–1 months). 
The infant comes to the world with a number of sensorimotor mechanisms, 
called reflexes which are involuntary responses to specific stimuli. One of them 
is the rooting reflex, i.e. the baby's tendency to turn the head towards any object 
that gently touches its cheek. The newborn has also got the grasping reflex (i.e. it 
grasps any object placed in its palm), the sucking reflex, the crying reflex and 
many others. In terms of early speech production, these are vegetative sounds 
associated with the process of eating. Reflexes are a means of communication 
with the outside world. In the beginning, they are very crude, but in the course of 
development  they  become  more  efficient  and  voluntary.  For  example,  the 
sucking  reflex  undergoes  the  modification  that  enables  the  infant  to  reject 
substances other than food. At the same time it becomes capable of sucking more 
quickly and vigorously. 
Stage 2: Primary Circular Reactions (1–4 months). 
The  second  stage  is  based  upon  the  previous  developmental  stage,  as 
observed by Piaget (1948). The term circular refers to the circularity or repetitive 
aspects of behaviour. On the other hand, the adjective primary indicates that the 
infant's activities such as thumb sucking, babbling or shaking its arms involve 
only its own body. In all these instances the goal of the activity is the same as the 
means to achieve it. For example, the infant's shaking its arms serves no other 
aim than performing the activity itself. 
At  this  stage  there  can  be  observed  the  assimilation  of  more  and  more 
stimulus patterns and subsequent coordination of various schemata, e.g. hearing 
and looking at the object at the same time. The behaviour of the child begins to  
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be  centered  on  objects  but  its  world  consists  solely  of  sensorimotor  events, 
components  of  its  own  functioning.  The  infant  will  tend  to  repeat  some 
behaviour if by accident it leads to interesting events. As observed by Piaget: 
Sometimes, for example, the wail which precedes or prolongs the crying is kept 
for  its  own  sake  because  it  is  an  interesting  sound  (Piaget  1952:219).  It  is 
emphasized that it is then that the first circular reactions related to phonation 
may definitely be observed (Piaget 1952:220). 
To sum up, during the second stage the beginning of intergration of inherited 
patterns of behaviour into habits and perceptions can be observed. This stage is 
often  called  the  stage  of  reproductive  assimilations,  whereby  there  occur 
reproductions or repetitions of newly acquired structures. 
Stage 3: Secondary Circular Reactions (4–8 months). 
In the third stage reactions are still circular (that is, the infant is involved in 
repeating an interesting event), but also secondary in the sense that the action of 
the infant's body is used as a means that brings about the results other than the 
activity itself. For example, when the infant shakes its arms, it may cause the 
mobile attached to the crib to move. The child then repeats this activity to see the 
outside event again. During stage 3 the initial separation of means and ends can 
be observed. This is just the beginning of the whole process, because the relation 
of means to ends is fortuitous. It is only after an interesting event has occurred 
that the infant desires it. Moreover, its behaviour is aimed solely at repeating the 
prior events, the baby is not yet inventing any new behaviour. 
The  infant  does  not  have  concepts  at  this  time  but  only  its  sensorimotor 
schemata. Whereas primary circular reactions help to establish primary schemata, 
such as: grasping, shaking and vocalizing, secondary circular reactions lead to 
secondary schemata that are sensorimotor impressions of the particular features of 
objects. They are antecedents to later classes of concepts. According to Piaget 
(1952:234):  the  secondary  schemata  constitute  the  first  outline  of  what  will 
become  classes  or  concepts  of  reflective  intelligence:  perceiving  an  object  as 
something  to  shake,  to  rub,  etc.  These  are  the  first  foundations  of  the  later 
classification of objects and their characteristic features, which will be responsible 
for the establishing of the notion of the parts of speech. 
Stage 4: Coordination of Secondary Schemata (8–12 months). 
In stage 4 we can observe further separation of means from ends. During 
stage 3 the infant lost interest in action, if the obstacle was interposed between it 
and an object. That was only the beginning of intention. In stage 4, however, 
much more clear separation of means from ends can be observed. Suppose, for 
example, that the child wants to grasp the box the parent is holding behind the 
cushion. It is not discouraged by the obstacle and uses some of its schemata to 
obtain  the  goal.  It  strikes  the  cushion  and  depresses  it  with  one  hand  while 
grasping the object with the other. The important point to make here is that motor 
meaning is replaced by symbolic meaning. In stage three, the child recognized an  
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object by performing an action that had previously occurred in its presence. This 
action was the ‘meaning’ of that object for the child. Now the actions begin to 
have their underlying mental representations.
2 
Stage 4 is also characterised by what Piaget has called object permanence. 
Object permanence is defined as the knowledge that objects continue to exist 
even  when  they  are  no  longer  seen. The  child  begins  to  search  actively  for 
objects that the adults hide somewhere. This development of object permanence 
provides the evidence that the infant's reliance on symbols becomes more and 
more  advanced  and  gradually  replaces  its  sensorimotor  schemata.  Finally, 
imitative skills are also improving. During stage 3 the imitation was limited to 
the sounds that the infant has already produced. In stage 4 attempts at novel 
sounds appear for the first time. This will appear to be essential for language 
acquisition. 
Stage 5: Tertiary Circular Reactions (12–18 months). 
At  this  stage  the  infant  has  progressed  to  the  point  of  actively  seeking 
novelty.  It  deliberately  manipulates  the  environment  and  produces  some 
interesting spectacles (see Philips (1969)). This time the spectacle is separate 
from the overt action and even after it has occurred the child does not cease to 
vary its movements. One can think of the stage 5 baby as the first ‘scientist’. 
Thus,  in  stage  5  the  infant  starts  to  discover  new  ways  not  used  before. 
Ineffective means drop out and gradually the performance becomes deliberate 
and efficient. 
The fifth stage is characterised by the formation of new schemata which, as 
Piaget (1952:305) puts it, are no longer due to simple reproduction of fortuitous 
results but to a sort of experimentation or search for novelty as such. The child 
begins to use objects as means, e.g. a stick to move or to get an object. This 
achievement coincides with the first purposeful vocalisations, that is, language 
becomes one of the means the child can use to obtain certain ends, either through 
comprehension or production. These vocalisations are not yet words, because 
they  do  not  pair  vocalisations  with  concepts.  Instead  they  are  symbols,  they 
indicate the relationship that exists between objects or events and sounds. 
Another achievement of stage 5 is that the object is now being represented 
by  internal  symbols.  However,  at  this  point  the  child  still  cannot  cope  with 
invisible displacements, that is, it has to see the objects actually disappear. The 
child's interest in seeking objects is considered to be the neccesary condition for 
the establishment of a repository of conceptual schemas. The first step towards 
 
2 As an example supporting this statement let us quote Piaget's Observation 133 (Piaget 1952: 
249): At the age of nine months, sixteen days, Jacqueline likes the grape juice in a glass but not the 
soup in the bowl. She watches her mother's activity. When the spoon comes out of the glass she 
opens her mouth wide, whereas when the spoon comes out of the bowl her mouth remains close. 
Her mother tries to lead her to make a mistake by taking the spoon from the bowl and passing it by 
the glass before offering it to Jacqueline but she is not fooled.  
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this stage would be the creation of mental representations of objects in the child's 
mind. 
Stage 6: Beginning of Representational Thought (18–24 months). 
Piaget states that at this stage the child starts to think before acting. Stage 6 
clearly  marks  the  onset  of  representational  thinking,  which  involves  mental 
reasoning that is prior to acting. Another thing is that the child's conception of 
space is characterised by the increasing importance of the internalised symbols, 
e.g. the displacements of objects need no longer to be visible. The concept of 
time  has  undergone  the  same  transformation:  remembering  past  events  and 
anticipating future ones is possible because of the existence of internal symbols. 
However, Piaget (1948) does not believe that the sensorimotor thought involves 
language. Language is too rudimentary at this stage and the word meanings are 
unstable  and  idiosyncratic.  The  child  uses  one  word  to  label  many  objects, 
changing the meaning to suit its own purposes. Furthermore, all these changes 
can take place just within hours or even minutes.
3 
Summing  up,  during  the  sensorimotor  period  the  child's  sensorimotor 
schemata turn gradually into symbolic thinking. Undoubtedly, any two-year-old 
child's  thinking  cannot  be  compared  with  that  of  an  adult  and  his  mental 
capacity. However, there is no denying that it is the first step towards cognitive 
and linguistic maturity that is constructed by degrees on the basis of the child’s 
congenital potential. 
On the other hand, Piaget's theory was strongly criticised by those who 
conceived language development as independent of other cognitive capacities. 
For  example,  Chomsky  (1959)  proposed  the  existence  of  genetically 
transmitted LAD, independent of other cognitive capacities and responsible for 
language acquisition. In his work Review of Verbal Behaviour he appears as an 
adherent of strong innatism, i.e. the theory stating that not only structures and 
mechanisms  enabling  language  acquisition  (as  was  claimed  by  Piaget)  are 
predetermined, but also knowledge itself in the form of linguistic universals. 
Chomsky (1975) can see no reason why intellectual development should be 
separated from the physical one. In his view, if the physical structure of the 
organism  is  genetically  determined  and  is  taken  for  granted  with  such 
dimensions as size and rate of development being also inherited, why should we 
take a different approach to mental development? 
Thus, in his view every human being possesses a biologically determined 
basis  for  gaining  knowledge,  which is a  prerequisite  to  learning. This  innate 
 
3 Observing Polish children at this age I have noticed that the same syllable ‘ko’ or syllables 
’ko-ko’ (reduplication) may serve to represent a few objects, for example: kokardka ‘bow’, koniec 
‘end’, kopać ‘kick’, kolczyk ‘earring’, okulary ‘glasses’. Another instance would be the syllable 
‘dzie’ standing for: do widzenia ‘goodbye’, dzień dobry ‘good morning’ and dziękuję ‘thank you’. 
Piaget (1952:157) comments that: these first verbal schemas are intermediary between the schemas 
of sensorimotor intelligence and conceptual schemas.   
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capacity to attain knowledge enables an amazingly quick acquisition of language 
by the child within a relatively short period of time and without any specific 
training.  Furthermore,  Chomsky  (1971)  proposes  that  the  general  form  of  a 
system  of  knowledge  is  fixed  in  advance  as  predisposition  of  the  mind.  He 
presents abundant evidence to support the view that the form of language (not 
only special abilities that enable its acquisition) is innate. The first argument in 
favour of this statement, is that children are able to learn language in a relatively 
short  period  of  time  on  the  basis  of  fragmentary  and  impoverished  input. 
Chomsky  claims  that  children  can  learn  any  language  irrespective  of  their 
parents' nationality if only they are provided with sufficient exposure to it thanks 
to the existence of the so called language universals. 
Chomsky  believes  that  there  exist  certain  phonological,  syntactic  and 
semantic units of speech that are universal in the sense that although they do not 
occur  in  all  languages  of  the  world  they  may  occur  in  any  of  them.  Let  us 
consider, for example, some distinctive phonological features. One of them is 
[voicing] that differentiates p from b in the pronounciation of such words as pin 
and bin, or [nasality] that makes the difference between b and m in bad and mad. 
Certainly, not all of these features are found in every language but each language 
selects its own set out of them. These are substantive universals. In addition to 
that, Chomsky also talks about formal universals which determine the form and 
the manner of operation of grammatical rules. 
We may pose the following question: how does the child make use of the 
universals and how does it know which of them to choose in order to be able to 
speak a particular language? To account for this phenomenon, Chomsky (1971) 
formulates the so called innateness hypothesis which holds that we are endowed 
with a faculty that chooses specific universals necessary for the construction of 
the grammar of a particular language. This faculty is referred to as the language 
acquisition device (LAD). 
In order to construct the grammar of a language, LAD searches through a 
range  of  possible  hypotheses about language  structure and then  selects  those 
grammars that are compatible with the primary linguisic data at hand. To accept 
this theory we must assume that the child has already mastered a technique of 
representing structural information about input signals. LAD would then select 
one  of  the  potential  grammars  and  will  thus  construct  the  grammar  of  the 
language. Children who acquire language in this way know, of course, a lot more 
than they 'have learned'. Their knowledge goes far beyond the presented primary 
linguistic data and in no sense is it an inductive generalisation from this data but 
rather it emerges due to the activation by some relevant experience. 
The grammar constructed by LAD is referred to as generative grammar. This 
grammar  which  has  an  internal  representation  in  the  mind  is  a  system  that 
determines the phonetic, syntactic and semantic properties of an infinite number  
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of sentences. Thus, the child knows the language constructed by the grammar it 
has just learnt. 
According to Chomsky, the grammar of the language should generate 'all 
and only' sentences of the language, that is, all the sentences of the language, but 
only  the  grammatical  ones.  Chomsky  maintains  that  generative  grammar 
'projects' any set of sentences upon infinite set of sentences that constitute a 
given language. This property of the grammar demonstrates the creative property 
of  the  human  language.  The  creative  aspect  of  language  is,  according  to 
Chomsky, unconscious and unreflecting. 
This issue poses an especially challenging problem to the theory of language 
acquisition. It is one of the strongest arguments against behaviourism. Chomsky 
regards it as a good reason to believe that the reinforcement theory is not able to 
explain all facts of language behaviour because this theory is totally incapable of 
accounting for the fact that by the age of five or six children are able to produce 
and understand a large number of sentences that they have not previously heard, 
however succesful it might be in explaining how certain habits and associations 
are built up. Behaviourist theories of language acquisition cannot bridge the gap 
between the utterances that the child hears (often full of errors and distortions) 
and its ability to construct (on the basis of this impoverished and imperfect data) 
the grammatical rules governing the structure of language. 
Chomsky claims that it is the child's inborn knowledge of the universals that 
makes up for the deficiency in the behaviourist theory of language acquisition. 
However, he does not discard the model of stimulus and response completely. 
According to him, behaviourist tradition is capable of explaining some of the 
facts of language behaviour, especially those pertaining to objects in the child’s 
environment and also certain utterances that occur in its early life. Piaget also 
argues that behaviourist theory in its pure form is not a reliable explanation of 
first  language  acquisition,  but  his  antiempiricism  works  within  a  completely 
different framework. He proposes the existence of an inborn ability to process 
linguistic  data  and  on  the  basis  of that  to construct  the  grammar  of  a  given 
language. 
Piaget  is  convinced  that  the  fundamental  relationship  that  constitutes  all 
knowledge is not a mere association between objects, for this notion neglects the 
active role of the subject, but rather the assimilation of objects to the schemes of 
that  subject  (Piattelli-Palmarini  1980:350).  According  to  Piaget  (1951),  the 
process of immersion in an environment and interaction with it can be regarded 
as the process by which the developing organism will assimilate fragments of the 
environmental structure while accommodating its own schemas in the process of 
assimilation. 
On the other hand, Chomsky claims that since the structure of language is 
predetermined,  the  acquisition  consists  merely  in  the  unfolding  of  inborn 
predispositions. This process can be compared to a maturational growth of a  
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biological  organism.  In  Chomsky's  view  language  acquisition  proceeds 
according to a genetic programme imprinted on the mind. The acceptance of this 
assumption  is  tantamount  to  the  dismissal  of  the  possibility  of  development, 
which was of primary magnitude for Piaget. 
By the same token, the role of the environment was reduced to a mechanism 
merely  initiating  the  process  of  language  acquisition.  Data  coming  from  the 
environment  serve  just  to  reconstruct,  not  construct,  grammar  of  a  given 
language.  However,  Chomsky  claims  that  these  linguistic  rules  are  unfolded 
unconsciously while children are exposed to the samples of language and when 
they attempt to communicate. Therefore, it is maintained that the innatist theory 
refutes the claim about the close relationship of language and thought, viewing 
them as not mutually related entities. Moreover, it neglects the role of experience 
in language acquisition. 
On the contrary, Piaget strongly advocates the interrelation of language and 
cognitive processes. He insists on priority of thought over language, the former 
warranting the acquisition of the latter. In Piaget's view the establishment of the 
system  of  symbolic  representation  is a  prerequisite for the  emergence  of  the 
sound  system.  However,  it  is  not  an  instantenous  process,  as  in  the  case  of 
Chomsky's model. Instead, it is believed to consist of stages actively constructed 
by the child, whose system accommodates to the new situations and objects and 
assimilates these objects and situations into its own structures. For this reason, 
this approach is referred to as constructivist because it is the child who, having 
inherited cognitive capacities, creates mental representation of the world in its 
mind and consequently masters its native language. 
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